Supervised visitation

Paul Clements

In the first part of this series we looked at the guidelines drafted by the Massachusetts Department of Social Services for the operation of supervised visitation centers in Massachusetts. In this installment, some of the academic underpinnings of the supervised visitation movement are addressed by analyzing a seminal and authoritative article published two years ago.

In The Family Quarterly (Volume 29, #2, summer '95), lawyer/social scientist Robert B. Strauss (not to be confused with Murray Straus of UNH) writes, "Over the past decade, the major impetus for the growth of services for supervised child access has come from a rapidly expanding need for services for separated and divorced parents. The increase in divorces from the 1960's through the 1980's, the popularity of no-fault divorce and joint custody, the indeterminate nature of the "best interests" standards for decisions about children, the increase in out-of-wedlock births, initiatives to increase enforcement of child support, and counter-initiatives demanding enforcement of visitation, have all contributed to a vast increase in the amount of litigation over child access."

Even though Straus admits that "best interests" is a nebulous concept, the totality of the above quote indicates that the feminist lobby for "feel good" legislation has resulted in a dramatic increase in divorce and gender conflict. However, he does admit to a child's need for continued contact with both parents.

In the article, Straus insinuates that all allegations of domestic violence are "serious," and that counterclaims of interrupted visitation are a form of "denial." He promotes supervised visitation as the remedy. It should be noted that Straus runs a supervised visitation center in Cambridge, MA. and might be subject to a conflict of interest.

Of course, we agree with Straus that there may be valid reasons for supervision of visits. Along with alcoholism, mental illness, etc., Straus lists "no prior contact" or "extended interruption," as well as a "contested allegations" as reasons that a child is at risk. He therefore opens the door to fraudulent abuse allegations. Straus defines "domestic violence" as male against female violence, and repeatedly refers to "allegations" of same to justify supervised visits. His sexism is quite clear, as is his promotion of the business he himself is engaged in.

To promote that business, Straus describes a dramatic "need" for such services. A survey in New York City disclosed an "estimated" referral rate of 4,800 men per year. Multiplied by the average fee of $60 for a one-hour visiting session, that would produce an income to the agency of $288,000 per year.

Yet Straus maintains that this is not a moneymaking proposition. Furthermore, he advocates having agencies provide ancillary services such as transportation, education, counseling, legal aid, other social services; one assumes for additional fees. The cost, he recommends, should be borne by the fathers, although he almost contradicts himself by offering the opinion that if the service is intended to protect the child, both parents should share the cost. The DSS guidelines (see Part 1, last issue) hold the father totally responsible. Additional funding, Straus says, should come from grants and subsidies of public funds. The Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, for example, provides $75.9 million per year for supervised visitation.

The "need" which Strauss discusses is largely drawn from surveying groups with specific biases, such as services for battered women and women's resource centers. As a person educated in the social sciences, Straus should be fully aware of the impropriety of selecting and limiting his sample population, but he does this repeatedly in the article. The end result is a set of carefully engineered results designed to support a preconceived thesis.

Straus emphatically declares that "Supervision is not an evaluation to determine the appropriateness of future child access, nor is it child psychotherapy, nor a substitute for difficult decisions by the court." Again, DSS disagrees. They see the visitation center making all kinds of policy, legal, and therapeutic decisions. Many of these decisions, Straus admits, are based on subjective opinions and anecdotal experiences of staff members. However, he ignores the obvious biases of such staff, and the possibility that they may result in restrictions and regulations, which are intolerable to a falsely accused father. He assumes that women can't or won't lie, and any man who denies guilt is thereby admitting his guilt. He does warn of the danger to be found in the use of visitation center for clinical evaluations, but that danger is also ignored by the DSS guidelines.

Straus opines that supervisors be trained to qualify as an "expert" for legal purposes, but the DSS guidelines define such training in terms which could also be used to define the curriculum of a women's studies course.

Next issue: Part 3. An expose

Previous issue: Part 1. Supervised visitation center guideline exposed

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